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CAN THE APPLICATION OF LACHES VIOLATE 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS?:  A 
SURPRISING ANSWER FROM A COPYRIGHT 
CIRCUIT SPLIT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Because all equitable terms tend to be softly defined and loosely used, a 
certain amount of confusion results.1 
On January 27, 2010, the separation of powers doctrine got prime-
time television coverage when President Obama openly criticized a 
recent Supreme Court decision2 during the State of the Union address.3  
Prefacing his comments by giving “due deference to separation of 
powers”4 and standing only a few feet away from members of the 
Supreme Court, the President outlined what he perceived to be the dire 
consequences of the Court’s wrongly-decided opinion.   Supreme Court 
Justices are expected to sit silently and refrain from reacting to the 
President’s speech,5 but Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. shook his head in 
disgust and “appeared to mouth the words ‘not true.’”6  Here, viewers 
                                                 
1 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES:  DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 104 (2d 
ed. 1993). 
2 The President criticized Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), 
which held that the ban in 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006) on corporate expenditures in elections 
violated the First Amendment.  Id. at 913. 
3 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 
2010, at A12. 
4 Id.  The separation of powers doctrine refers to the principle that the United States 
Government is separated into three distinct and independent branches:  executive, 
legislative, and judicial.  U.S. CONST.  art. I (granting legislative powers to a Congress 
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. II (vesting the 
executive power in a President of the United States); U.S. CONST. art. III (vesting the judicial 
power of the United States in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”).  See also 16A AM. JUR. 2D 
Constitutional Law § 246 (2010).  “[I]t is generally recognized that constitutional restraints 
are overstepped where one department of government attempts to exercise powers 
exclusively delegated to another, and that officers of any branch of the government may 
not usurp or exercise the powers of either of the others.”  Id.  This doctrine is a central 
feature of the federal government, and the Supreme Court emphasized “[t]his separation is 
not merely a matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism.  Its object is basic and 
vital, namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of 
government in the same hands.”  O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 526, 530 (1933) 
(citation omitted).    
5 Quinn Bowman, Criticism of President by Justice Is as Rare as Criticism of Court 
During SOTU, PBS Newshour, Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/ 
2010/03/coyle-criticism-of-president-by-justice-is-rare.html.  
6 Liptak, supra note 3. 
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watched as the executive branch of government castigated the judicial 
branch, all in front of an applauding legislative branch.  For those 
interested in the history of the separation of powers doctrine, this was 
high drama. 
While it is unlikely that we will ever see the President of the United 
States giving an impassioned speech about the abuse of laches, the 
equitable remedy is raising separation of powers concerns in the area of 
copyright law.  Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit calls the 
idea that laches could ever be in tension with the separation of powers 
doctrine “odd.”7  Four out of five circuits in a copyright circuit split 
disagree.8  The Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits cite the 
                                                 
7 Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 
881 (7th Cir. 2002).  Judge Posner writes that “just as various tolling doctrines can be used 
to lengthen the period for suit specified in a statute of limitations, so laches can be used to 
contract it.”  Id.  Posner notes that other courts have taken a different approach to laches.  
Id.  “We are mindful that some courts have invoked a presumption against the use of laches 
to shorten the statute of limitations.”  Id. (citing Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & 
Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 321 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d 
1195, 1207–08 (10th Cir. 2001); Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 799 (4th 
Cir. 2001)).  “One even made the presumption conclusive . . . on the odd ground that 
abridging a statutory period for suit by means of a judge-made doctrine is in tension with 
the separation of powers.”  Id. (citing Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 
257, 259–61 (2d Cir. 1997)).  Although Gorman Bros. dealt with a statute that did not contain 
an express federal statute of limitations, Posner’s discussion suggests that using laches to 
shorten either an express or a borrowed statute of limitations would be proper.  Id. 
8 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing each circuit’s position in the copyright circuit split).  
Support for the notion that a court’s exercise of equitable discretion could be in tension 
with the separation of powers comes from Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in a 1995 
case before the Supreme Court.  See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131–32 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., concurring).  Discussing the judiciary’s equitable powers in a school desegregation plan, 
Thomas writes, “Two clear restraints on the use of the equity power—federalism and the 
separation of powers—derive from the very form of our Government.”  Id. at 131.  
Although the case before the Court did not present a situation where one branch of 
government infringed on the rights of another, Justice Thomas recognized the possibility 
that a court’s equitable powers could violate the separation of powers doctrine.  Id. at 132.  
Justice Thomas writes:   
The separation of powers imposes additional restraints on the 
judiciary's exercise of its remedial powers.  To be sure, this is not a case 
of one branch of Government encroaching on the prerogatives of 
another, but rather of the power of the Federal Government over the 
States.  Nonetheless, what the federal courts cannot do at the federal 
level they cannot do against the States; in either case, Article III courts 
are constrained by the inherent constitutional limitations on their 
powers.  There simply are certain things that courts, in order to remain 
courts, cannot and should not do. 
Id.  Thomas goes on to discuss the history of the judiciary’s equitable powers in his 
criticism of structural injunctions.  Id. at 104–05.  Thomas notes that the “Framers 
approached equity with suspicion.”  Id. at 105.  After surveying the history of equity, 
Thomas concludes: 
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separation of powers doctrine as either a restraint or a complete bar on a 
court’s ability to use laches to shorten the express federal statute of 
limitations found in the Copyright Act of 1976.9  Circuit courts that ban 
or restrict laches due to separation of powers concerns reason that setting 
time limitations for copyright claims is the exclusive province of 
Congress, and when a court shortens a statute of limitations with an 
equitable remedy such as laches, the court oversteps its powers.10  In 
other words, when the judicial branch uses laches to bar a statutorily 
timely claim, they are essentially amending the Copyright Act, which is 
an action reserved for legislators.   
Is the equitable defense of laches the “golden girl” of equity or a 
judicial power grab?11  If courts use the judicially-created doctrine to cut 
short an explicit statute of limitations, are they simply exercising their 
traditional equitable powers to tailor fair relief, or are they violating the 
separation of powers doctrine which allocates different powers to the 
executive, judicial, and legislative branches?12 
                                                                                                             
that there is no early record of the exercise of broad remedial powers.  
Certainly there were no “structural injunctions” issued by the federal 
courts, nor were there any examples of continuing judicial supervision 
and management of governmental institutions.  Such exercises of 
judicial power would have appeared to violate principles of state 
sovereignty and of the separation of powers as late in the day as the 
turn of the century. 
Id. at 130.  This discussion seems contrary to Posner’s view that it is “odd” to suggest that 
an equitable remedy could be in tension with the separate of powers doctrine.  See supra 
note 7 (discussing Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 
283 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2002)).  Thomas’s review of history reveals that maintaining the 
separation of powers and being mindful of the principles of Federalism are very real 
concerns in equity jurisprudence. 
9 See Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); Chirco v. 
Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 
936 (10th Cir. 2002); Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 
1287 (11th Cir. 2008).  The Ninth Circuit does not mention the separation of powers 
doctrine in Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001).  See supra  note 4 for a 
discussion of the separation of powers doctrine. 
10 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the reasoning in Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh 
Circuit decisions). 
11 Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form:  Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of 
Laches, 1992 BYU L. REV. 917, 918.  “Contrast the statute of limitations with the doctrine of 
laches, that golden girl of equity jurisdiction.”  Id. 
12 See Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court:  Is the Tax Court’s Exercise of 
Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 375–78 (2001) (discussing the equitable 
powers of Article I courts and the doctrine of separation of powers).  The separation of 
powers is a constitutional doctrine concerning the divisions and balances between the roles 
of the legislature, executive branch, and judiciary.  Id.  A violation of the doctrine occurs 
when one branch assumes too much power or gives away too much of its power to another 
co-equal branch.  Id. at 363.  See generally TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN 
PRACTICE (2004) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each branch of 
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Conflicting answers to these questions can be found both inside and 
outside the copyright context.13  There is confusion in federal courts as to 
whether the equitable defense of laches may be used in various areas of 
the law to shorten statutes of limitations without violating the separation 
of powers doctrine.14  While a Supreme Court decision is sorely needed 
to provide guidance regarding the operation of laches and express 
statutes of limitation generally,15 an Amendment to the Copyright Act is 
the best solution to the current copyright circuit split.16 The 
                                                                                                             
government and analyzing which branch of government is most appropriate to handle 
certain disputes).  Campbell summarizes the power of the doctrine as well as the dangers of 
its abuse: 
The American system of government separates power.  It thereby 
achieves protection for its citizens against the potential of tyranny.  
The separation also can call forth advantages that each branch 
possesses for the efficient disposition of issues of public policy and 
private dispute and to enhance the public’s confidence in the fairness 
of the process that led to those dispositions.  In a government with no 
formal separation, a sacrifice is necessarily made of at least some of 
these advantages.  A danger exists also, however, of too severe a 
separation.  Where one branch fails to undertake a task for which it is 
the best suited, it willingly permits another branch to usurp that 
authority.  The consequences often include a compromise in the 
efficiency of the branch assuming the power from the branch giving it 
up. 
Id. at 1. 
13 See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing cases both inside and outside the copyright circuit 
split that hold conflicting positions on the issue of when laches may operate to shorten a 
statute of limitations). 
14 See infra Part II.C (discussing the use of laches in various areas of the law). 
15 For the argument that the application of laches violates the separation of powers 
doctrine and that a Supreme Court decision is the best solution to the split of authority see 
Ryan Christopher Locke, Note, Resetting the Doomsday Clock:  Is it Constitutional for Laches to 
Bar Copyright Infringement Claims Within the Statute of Limitations?, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
133, 153, 156 (2008−2009).  See also Misty Kathryn Nall, Note, (In) Equity in Copyright Law:  
The Availability of Laches to Bar Copyright Infringement Claims, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 325, 346 
(2008) (arguing that laches should be banned in copyright cases because the application of 
the equitable remedy within the statute of limitations impermissibly “circumvents the 
federal statute” and violates the separation of powers doctrine). 
16 See infra Part IV (offering a proposed amendment to the Copyright Act that would 
standardize laches analysis in copyright claims); infra Part II.C (discussing the guidance 
offered by the United States Supreme Court regarding the application of the equitable 
defense of laches).  For the argument that separation of powers concerns are “only 
marginal at best” in copyright law, see Vikas K. Didwania, Note, The Defense of Laches in 
Copyright Infringement Claims, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1257 (2008).  In part, Didwania 
reasons that a statute of limitations functions as only a maximum time limitation and not a 
guaranteed minimum time period in which to file.  Id. at 1245.  In other words, “It is 
unclear why just because a statute of limitations grants a plaintiff up to three years means it 
must also always grant a plaintiff at least three years.”  Id.  Contra 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation 
of Actions § 8 (2010).  “A statute of limitations signifies a fixed period within which an 
action may be brought to preserve a right . . . .”  Id.  See also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN 
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consequences of the circuit split are illustrated by the following 
hypothetical.17 
Imagine you are a small business owner whose arts and crafts store 
is struggling.  One Halloween, you overhear customers complaining 
about the lack of decent children’s costumes available for the holiday.  In 
an attempt to boost revenue, you design a series of costumes and rent 
them out from your shop.  The costumes are a huge success.  Each year, 
you invest more in advertising and your rental business grows.  In your 
eleventh and most profitable year of renting costumes, you are shocked 
when you are sued for copyright infringement.  The creator of a 
children’s cartoon alleges that one of your costumes infringes one of its 
copyrighted characters.  Outraged, you learn that the copyright holder 
has known about your costumes for the past ten years.  Can she sit back 
and watch for a decade as you build a successful business and sue you 
just when your profits peak?  Isn’t there a remedy that protects 
defendants from such gross delay? 
The answer is that laches is the defense you seek, but its viability 
depends on the circuit.  If you are sued in the Fourth Circuit, laches is 
unavailable.18  The statute of limitations will be calculated from the time 
of the most recent costume rental, and the plaintiff’s claim will be 
timely.19  However, if you are in the Ninth Circuit, laches is available to 
potentially stop the lawsuit.20  If the costumes never substantially 
changed, the court will calculate the laches period from the very first 
rental and will likely hold that the plaintiff who waited ten years to sue 
unreasonably delayed filing her claim.21  In sum, laches cannot help you 
in the Fourth Circuit, but in the Ninth Circuit, it just might save your 
business. 
                                                                                                             
AMERICAN REMEDIES:  CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (3d ed. 2002).  “The conventional statute of 
limitations creates a fixed time in which suit must be filed.  Time begins to run when the 
cause of action accrues, and the suit is barred when time runs out.  It is possible to precisely 
identify the very last day on which suit can be filed.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  If statutes of 
limitations function only as maximum time limits and do not also protect a clearly-defined 
time in which a plaintiff may decide to file, due process concerns arise, especially in cases 
that do not involve continuing wrongs.  See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 115–16, n.1 (noting that 
one key element of due process is “standards that can be known in advance”).     
17 The contents of this hypothetical are loosely based on the facts of Lyons P’ship v. 
Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that laches does not apply 
to copyright claims within the statutory period).  However, the facts have been altered and 
all names and characters are purely fictional. 
18 Lyons, 243 F.3d at 798. 
19 See id. 
20 Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that laches may bar 
relief, including prospective injunctive relief, where the feared future infringements are 
identical to the alleged past infringements). 
21 See id. 
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This Note focuses on the conflicting approaches courts take to laches 
in copyright claims and briefly discusses cases outside the copyright 
context to highlight the fact that the use of laches is raising separation of 
powers concerns in other areas of the law.22  Part II examines the 
background of equity jurisprudence, the defense of laches, statutes of 
limitations, and the Copyright Act.23  Part III analyzes three possible 
resolutions to the copyright circuit split and examines to what extent 
each solution resolves separation of powers concerns and furthers the 
goals of the Copyright Act.24  Part IV argues that laches should be 
available as a defense in copyright claims and proposes an amendment 
to the Copyright Act that combines the approaches of the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits.25  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Few American citizens, however, would think of 
themselves in court as humble petitioners, on their knees 
before the judge who may deny relief on grounds that cannot 
be stated as principles or applied even-handedly to all 
suitors . . . .  So a full-blown discretion in the chancellor to 
deny relief may be hard to reconcile with the ideal of rights 
under the law.26 
It may be shocking to the average American to learn that when a 
judge rules on an equitable defense such as laches, she is ruling with 
powers inherited from a time when begging before an authoritative 
bishop in court was commonplace.27  The discretion available in equity 
might be particularly alarming when it is applied to a right firmly 
                                                 
22 See infra Part II.C. 
23 See infra Part II.C. 
24 See infra Part III. 
25 See infra Part IV. 
26 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 115–16. 
27 Id.  Dobbs noted that the broad equitable discretion available in the original courts of 
equity are contrary to our modern concept of courts: 
The chancellor’s discretion to deny relief is a peculiar tradition to 
encounter in a democratic society where citizens possess rights under 
the law, not merely the hope of indulgence.  The chancellor–bishop’s 
discretion to refuse enforcement of established rights may have 
seemed normal in 16th century England.  He was an authoritative 
bishop who gave relief as a matter of grace and discretion to 
individuals who were subjects of the Crown, not citizens of a 
democracy. 
Id. at 115. 
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established by the Constitution, such as copyright protection.28  When 
addressing an issue concerning copyright infringement, it is imperative 
to note at the outset the importance the United States Constitution places 
on an individual’s right to protect intellectual property.29 
An interesting bit of trivia about the United States Constitution is 
that the term “right” is used only once in the entire document as ratified 
in 1787—in the copyright clause.30   In Article I, Section eight, Congress 
has the power to protect authors and inventors by securing their 
“exclusive Right” to writings and discoveries.31  By grant of this 
constitutional authority, Congress first set out to protect intellectual 
property with the Copyright Act of 1790, and the act now in effect is the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (“Act” or “Copyright Act”).32  
                                                 
28 See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (discussing the importance the founders 
placed on the right to protect intellectual property). 
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The Constitution states that Congress has the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  Id. 
30 Id.  See also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008).  The fact that the word 
“right” is only used once in the eight articles of the Constitution is mentioned in a case 
before the Court concerning prisoners.  Id.  Considering the rights of Guantanamo 
detainees, the Court points to the specificity used in the Suspension Clause as evidence of 
the Framers’ intent to establish the writ of habeus corpus as a “vital” protection of liberty.  
Id.  The Court applies this reasoning to the Copyright context and notes that the Copyright 
Clause contains the only use of the word “right” in the entire ratified document.  Id.  For a 
discussion of an intent–based approach to interpreting the copyright clause see Ralph 
Oman, The Copyright Clause:  “A Charter For a Living People,” 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 103 
(1987). 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
32 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006).  For a basic discussion of previous Copyright Acts and 
subsequent amendments see PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, 
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 648, 649−50 (6th ed. 2008).  See also MARSHALL 
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 6–15 (3d ed., 1999).  Leaffer notes that before 
any copyright act existed in America, the colonies had their own forms of copyright laws.  
Id. at 6.  The Framers of the Constitution placed the Copyright Clause in the document 
because they recognized a need for uniformity in copyright and patent law.  Id.  Congress 
passed the first copyright act in 1790, and modeled it on the English Statute of Anne which 
gave authors protection of their maps, charts and books for two fourteen year terms.  Id. at 
7.  The second federal copyright law came with the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”) after 
President Theodore Roosevelt called for a revision of copyright law to keep pace with 
modern conditions.  Id.  An important change in the 1909 Act was that protection was 
expanded to “all the writings of an author.”  Id.  The 1909 Act also expanded the amount of 
time a copyrighted work could be protected.  Id. 7–8.  The law imposed two twenty-eight 
year terms, with the second term as a renewal term which allowed for the option to protect 
the work for fifty-six years.  Id.  The current Copyright Act protects material that was fixed 
in a tangible form on or after January 1, 1978, for the life of the author plus seventy years.  
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
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One of the issues courts face when interpreting the Copyright Act 
concerns the length of time plaintiffs have to bring a claim. 33  Circuits are 
split as to whether a plaintiff may be time-barred by the equitable 
doctrine of laches before the statute has run.34 
At first glance, the split appears to be a relatively simple one with 
the Fourth Circuit as the only circuit supporting a flat ban on the 
application of laches to claims filed within three years of a copyright 
violation.35  The Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits vary as to the 
                                                 
33 Doctrine of Laches May be Used to Reduce Limitations Period in Some Copyright Suits, 75 
U.S.L.W. 1420 (Jan. 23, 2007) (highlighting a circuit split over whether laches is available as 
an affirmative defense under the Copyright Act).  The express statute of limitations has 
created a circuit split regarding its application in a civil action.  Id.  See 17 U.S.C. §  507 
(2006).  The Act provides an express statute of limitations for both civil and criminal 
actions.  Id.  The Act states, “Except as expressly provided otherwise in this title, no 
criminal proceeding shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is 
commenced within 5 years after the cause of action arose.”  Id. § 507(a).  For civil actions, 
the statute provides, “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title 
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”  Id. § 507(b).  Despite 
the apparent simplicity of a three–year statute of limitations, the provision has caused a 
circuit split.  Doctrine of Laches, supra.  See also BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE:  
THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM 76 (2006).  President Barack Obama notes 
that even the simplest of provisions in a statute can cause an enormous amount of 
controversy.  Id.  Obama writes: 
The simplest statute—a requirement, say, that companies provide 
bathroom breaks to their hourly workers—can become the subject of 
wildly different interpretations, depending on whom you are talking 
to:  the congressman who sponsored the provision, the staffer who 
drafted it, the department head whose job it is to enforce it, the lawyer 
whose client finds it inconvenient, or the judge who may be called 
upon to apply it. 
Id.  Obama goes on to note that controversy over a simple clause in a statute is, in part, due 
to the separation of powers.  Id. at 76–77. 
Some of this is by design, a result of the complex machinery of checks 
and balances.  The diffusion of power between the branches, as well as 
between federal and state governments, means that no law is ever 
final, no battle truly finished; there is always the opportunity to 
strengthen or weaken what appears to be done, to water down a 
regulation or block its implementation, to contract an agency’s power 
with a cut in its budget, or to seize control of an issue where a vacuum 
has been left. 
Id. 
34 Doctrine of Laches, supra note 33.  
35 Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
laches does not apply to copyright claims within the statutory period).  See Dylan Ruga, 
Comment, The Role of Laches in Closing the Door on Copyright Infringement Claims, 29 NOVA L. 
REV. 663, 684–85 (2005) (arguing that because the Supreme Court holds that equitable 
defenses may not be applied to legal remedies, the only viable solution to the copyright 
circuit split is to allow the defense of laches to bar only equitable relief); Jason R. Swartz, 
Comment, When the Door Closes Early:  Laches as an Affirmative Defense to Claims of Copyright 
Infringement, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1457, 1474–78 (2008) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s 
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application of the equitable defense, but all hold that laches is available 
in certain circumstances.36  However, upon closer inspection, the circuit 
split is more complicated than a lone circuit with a position contrary to 
the majority.37  The circuit split reveals a deeper divide regarding the 
role of laches and the separation of powers doctrine generally.38 
 Below, Part II.A discusses the major policy objectives behind 
copyright law as well as the origins and provisions of the Copyright Act 
of 1976.39  Part II.B contains an overview of the equitable defense of 
laches.40  Part II.C introduces the argument raised by some circuits that 
the application of laches can violate the separation of powers doctrine 
and explores where the circuits stand on the issue both inside and 
outside the context of the Copyright Act.41 
A. The Copyright Act of 1976 
Two main objectives of copyright law are to reward creators for their 
labor and to serve the public good by encouraging the production of 
original work.42  First, one justification for protecting intellectual 
                                                                                                             
approach is the best balance between the Fourth Circuit’s ban on laches as an affirmative 
defense and the Ninth Circuit’s liberal approach). 
36 Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1321–22 
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that laches may bar only retrospective damages in extraordinary 
circumstances); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that laches may bar relief within the statutory period when relief sought will  create an 
unjust hardship on the defendants or on innocent third parties); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book 
Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that laches may cut short a statute of limitations 
in rare cases); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
laches may bar relief, including prospective injunctive relief, where the feared future 
infringements are identical to the alleged past infringements). 
37 While the Fourth Circuit is the only court to completely ban the application of laches 
within the statute of limitations period because of separation of powers concerns, the Sixth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits allow laches only in unusual circumstances and agree that the 
application of the doctrine raises separation of powers concerns.  See Peter Letterese, 533 
F.3d at 1321–22; Chirco, 474 F.3d at 236; Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 936; Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 
798;.  The Ninth Circuit is the only court to exclude separation of powers principles from 
laches analysis.  See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 959–60. 
38 See supra note 4 (explaining the basic concept of the separation of powers doctrine). 
39 See infra Part II.A (discussing policy, provisions, and history of the Copyright Act). 
40 See infra Part II.B (discussing the history of law and equity and the equitable defense 
of laches). 
41 See infra Part II.C (discussing separation of powers concerns and approaches used in 
laches analysis both inside and outside the copyright circuit split). 
42 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 2 (2010) (citing Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975)).  “While the immediate effect of the copyright 
law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor, the ultimate aim is, by this 
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”  Id.  Further, 
copyright law creates “incentives for development, with dissemination, which seeks to 
foster learning, progress, and development.”  Id. 
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property is that each person has a right to be compensated for her 
labor.43  For example, it would be unjust for an author to write a book 
that becomes famous world-wide, yet leaves the writer uncompensated 
for her contribution to knowledge or for her artful expression.44  Second, 
the literal goal of copyright law as stated in the Constitution is to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” and the broad 
purpose is to serve the public good.45  The idea is that copyright law 
encourages individuals to introduce their creations into the market and 
thereby share them with the public, increasing the welfare of all.46  
Arguably, the founders designed the copyright clause as an incentive to 
ensure that the public welfare will always be enriched by the creations of 
individuals.47  The design of the first copyright statute in the United 
States was similar to an English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne.48 
United States copyright law finds its origins in fifteenth century 
England with the founding of the printing press at Westminster.49  After 
the founding of the press, the Crown issued patents for printing to 
control the newly generated materials.50  These patents served not only 
as mechanisms to prevent infringement of other licensed works, but also 
as censorship tools to control “seditious matter.”51  Censorship 
                                                 
43 LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 16–17 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT Ch. 5 (1960) (1690)).  Leaffer notes that the concept of a person’s moral right 
to “reap the fruits of his or her own labor” is based on natural law philosophy.  Id.  Leaffer 
points to John Locke, a famous natural law proponent, who posited that people own their 
bodies, the labor of their bodies and the fruits of that labor.  Id. at 17. 
44 See id. 
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994).  The 
Fogerty Court stated: 
More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright Act are more 
complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of 
meritorious suits for copyright infringement . . . .  We have often 
recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, 
while “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward,” are limited in nature 
and must ultimately serve the public good. 
Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984)). 
46  18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 2 (2008). 
47 Id. “Thus, copyright policy is meant to balance protection, which seeks to ensure a fair 
return to authors and inventors and thereby to establish incentives for development, with 
dissemination, which seeks to foster learning, progress, and development.”  Id.  See also Tim 
Hering, Comment, Users and Abusers:  Has the Distinction Been Legislated out of Copyright, 83 
OR. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (2004) (citing CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.03[A] (6th ed. 
2003)). 
48 GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 32, at 648; Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
49 GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 32, at 648. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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ultimately declined in the seventeenth century, and Parliament passed 
the first copyright act in 1709.52 
In America, Congress enacted the first federal copyright statute in 
1790.53  Like the Statute of Anne, the 1790 statute provided for a 
fourteen-year term that was renewable if the author was still living.54  If 
any person “printed, reprinted, published, or imported from any foreign 
kingdom or state, any copy of copies of such map, chart, book or books, 
without the consent of the author or proprietor thereof, first had and 
obtained in writing, signed in the presence of two or more credible 
witnesses” they were subject to a fine of fifty cents for each infringing 
sheet found in that person’s possession.55  Additionally, to obtain 
protection, the author had to file a copy of the work with the clerk of the 
court and pay sixty cents for the registration.56  The original statute 
allowed the author one year to file a cause of action for infringement.57  
The purpose for the current statute of limitations in the Copyright 
Act is to prevent forum shopping among circuits and create uniformity 
in the courts. 58  Prior to 1957, versions of the Act did not contain a 
uniform statute of limitations, and courts borrowed analogous state 
statutes of limitations for torts and applied them to copyright claims.59  
As a result, limitations periods varied widely from state to state.60  To 
eliminate forum shopping, Congress enacted Section 507(b) of the 
                                                 
52  Id.  The statute provided authors with a once-renewable term of fourteen years and 
contained penalties for infringement.  Id.; Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
53 Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).   
54 Id. 
55 Id.  According to an economic history services website created by Samuel H. 
Williamson, Professor of Economics, Emeritus, from Miami University, fifty cents in 1790 is 
worth twelve dollars and eleven cents in 2010 (using the Consumer Price Index).  
http://measuringworth.com/index.html (follow “Relative Values - US $” hyperlink) (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2010).   The registration fee today for a basic claim in an original work of 
authorship ranges from thirty-five dollars to sixty-five dollars.  
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).  
56 Act of May 31, 1790.     
57 Id. 
58 John E. Theuman, Annotation, Construction and Application of 17 U.S.C.A. § 507(b), 
Requiring That Civil Copyright Action be Commenced Within 3 Years After Claim Accrued, 140 
A.L.R. FED. 641, § 2(a) (1997).  Some federal courts used the state statute of limitations for 
torts and others used the limitations period for actions such as conversion, contracts, or 
trover.  Id.  Theuman notes that this resulted in a “wide divergence of time limits for filing 
suit” which resulted in forum shopping.  Id.  To resolve the disparity and eliminate the 
problem, Congress set the federal statute of limitations at three years after the cause of 
action accrues.  Id.  See also Swartz, supra note 35, at 1462–63 (discussing the history of the 
Copyright Act and arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s approach to the copyright split is the 
best to resolve the controversy). 
59 Theuman, supra note 58, § 2(a). 
60 Id. 
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Copyright Act which mandates that a copyright holder must file within 
three years after the claim accrues.61 
Courts vary, however, as to when a claim accrues.62  If a jurisdiction 
uses a discovery rule, then a claim accrues when a litigant knows or 
should have known of the infringement.63  If a jurisdiction uses an injury 
rule, then the claim accrues when the infringement actually occurs, 
regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge.64  Some courts view a series of 
infringing acts as one “continuing wrong.”65  In cases of continuing 
wrongs, the three-year statute of limitations begins to run at the time of 
the most recent of those acts.66  Liability attaches to all acts of 
infringement, including infringements that occurred more than three 
years prior to filing suit.67  Other courts reject the continuing wrong 
theory and assess damages only for those infringements that occurred 
during the three years prior to filing.68  Once an infringement is 
established, the Copyright Act affords copyright holders a wide variety 
of remedies.69 
                                                 
61 17 U.S.C. § 507.  In criminal proceedings, a claim must be “commenced within five 
years after the cause of action arose.”  Id. § 507(a).  However, the statute provides that “[n]o 
civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced 
within three years after the claim accrued.”  Id. § 507 (b).  See 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 12.05 (2008) (identifying that this “spare formulation” regarding accrual 
presents a “host of problems”). 
62 Theuman, supra note 58, § 2(a). 
63 NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.05(B)(2).  See Heriot, supra note 11, at 926.  Despite 
Congress’s intent, the goal of creating uniformity through a statute of limitations has not 
been entirely successful due the different ways courts handle the question of when a claim 
accrues.  Id.  Heriot argues that recent history has witnessed a convergence of statutes of 
limitations and the equitable doctrine of laches.  Id. at 967.  Heriot attributes the melding of 
the two doctrines to the methods courts treat discovery rules which “toll the 
commencement of the limitations period when plaintiff is excusably unaware of his or her 
cause of action.”  Id. at 954.  The author urges that courts that change rigid rules like 
statutes of limitations into more flexible standards should be “viewed with suspicion in 
part because they are increasing their own power.”  Id. at 968.  She notes the difficulty 
legislatures would have in formulating a workable statute to penalize judges and restrict 
their liberal treatment of statutes of limitations.  Id. at 963. 
64 Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (adopting 
an injury rule for claim accrual in copyright infringement cases).  The court looked to the 
legislative history of the Copyright Act and reasoned that Congress intended a cause to 
accrue the moment the infringement occurred, regardless of plaintiff’s knowledge.  Id. at 
245. 
65  NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.05(B)(1) (citing Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 
1983)). 
66 Theuman, supra note 58, § 3(a). 
67 NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.05(B)(1). 
68 Id. 
69 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–05 (2006) (providing for injunctions, impoundments and disposal of 
infringing articles, infringer’s profits, costs and attorneys’ fees, seizure, forfeiture of the 
infringing articles, actual and statutory damages). 
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The Copyright Act provides a host of legal and equitable remedies, 
and the nature of the remedy sought becomes relevant to the availability 
of laches.70  The Act provides for injunctions,71 impounding and 
disposition of infringing articles,72 damages and profits,73 costs and 
attorney’s fees,74 and seizure and forfeiture.75  Some of the Act’s 
remedies are legal, such as actual and statutory damages.76  Other 
remedies provided by the Act are equitable, such as injunctions.77  
Courts have traditionally used laches to bar only equitable remedies and 
a statute of limitations to bar only legal relief.78  However, both inside 
and outside the context of the Copyright Act, the application of laches is 
                                                 
70 Id.  The Act provides for, inter alia, statutory damages and injunctions.  Id. § 504.  See 
LAYCOCK, supra note 16 for a discussion of legal and equitable remedies.  Damages are a 
legal remedy and, in general, compensatory and punitive remedies are legal.  Id.  
Injunctions are one of “the most important” equitable remedies.  Id.  With exceptions, 
Laycock classifies most legal remedies as substitutionary and most equitable remedies as 
specific.  Id.  Laycock describes the distinction: 
Remedies may be divided into two more basic categories:  The most 
fundamental remedial choice is between substitutionary and specific 
remedies.  With substitutionary remedies, plaintiff suffers harm and 
receives a sum of money.  Specific remedies seek to avoid this 
exchange.  They aspire to prevent harm, or undo it, rather than let it 
happen and compensate for it.  They seek to prevent harm to plaintiff, 
repair the harm in kind, or restore the specific thing that plaintiff lost. 
Id. at 6.  See also Ruga, supra note 35, at 683. (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) and arguing that after the application of the 
Supreme Court test established in Terry to each remedy to determine which are legal and 
which are equitable in nature, laches should only be available to bar the equitable 
remedies). 
71 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006). 
72 Id. § 503. 
73 Id. § 504. 
74 Id. § 505. 
75 Id. § 509. 
76 LAYCOCK, supra note 16 (noting that damages are the most important legal remedy). 
77 Id. (noting injunctions and specific performance decrees are the most important 
equitable remedies). 
78 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 103.  “When laches does not amount to estoppel or waiver, 
it does not ordinarily bar legal claims, only equitable remedies.”  Id. at 104.  The traditional 
function of the doctrine was to operate as a “flexible” statute of limitations barring delayed 
claims where no statute of limitations existed.  Id.  Dobbs writes that, “This traditional 
function suggests that laches should be limited to cases in which no statute of limitations 
applies.”  Id.  But see A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029–
30 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citing Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 478 
(5th Cir. 1980) (noting that laches has been extended from suits in equity to suits at law and 
has become “part of the general body of rules governing relief in the federal court 
system”). 
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not so simple.79  Below is an overview of the defense, its history, and its 
elements.80 
B. The Equitable Defense of Laches 
Laches is an equitable defense which was historically only available 
in courts of equity.81  In thirteenth and fourteenth century England, 
courts were divided into courts of law and courts of equity.82  The 
Chancellor, the second most powerful official next to the King, heard 
claims in a court of equity and applied a set of rules, procedures, and 
remedies that were separate from those applied in courts of law.83  
Equity courts did not use statutes of limitations, and if a plaintiff’s delay 
in coming to court was inexcusable or had caused prejudice to the 
defendant, the Chancellor would bar relief according to the doctrine of 
laches.84  Based on the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas 
                                                 
79 See infra Part II.C (discussing separation of powers concerns and what approach is 
used to laches analysis both inside and outside the copyright circuit context.).  See also 
LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003 (noting confusion in the courts as to whether laches may 
operate to shorten a statute of limitations).  “When an equitable claim is subject to a statute 
of limitations, laches is irrelevant unless it bars the claim before the limitations period 
expires. . . .  It is rare to bar a claim for laches before an applicable statute of limitations has 
run on a one–time event; some cases say it just can’t happen.”  Id.; see also County of Oneida 
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (noting in dicta that the application 
of laches in an action at law would be “novel”). 
80 See infra Part II.B (discussing the history and elements of the equitable defense of 
laches). 
81 LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 959.  Laycock summarizes the pre-merger use of laches: 
 Before the merger of law and equity, equitable defenses were 
recognized by the chancellors but not by the law courts.  The 
chancellors made some of these defenses available at law by enjoining 
the opposing litigant from pursuing his claim; fraud is the prime 
example.  Other defenses, such as laches and unclean hands, were 
available only in equity. 
 Since the merger of law and equity, the term equitable defenses has 
had no very precise meaning.  In common usage, it means those 
defenses that were historically equitable and perhaps others similar to 
them. 
Id. 
82 Id. at 7.  See also Ruga, supra note 35, at 670–72 (summarizing the history of law and 
equity in light of Supreme Court precedent and arguing that in modern American courts, 
laches can defeat only equitable claims). 
83 Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting 
that the Chancellor in Equity was called the “King’s Conscience”); Ruga, supra note 35, at 
670–72 (noting that many considered the chancellor to be the “government’s leading moral 
authority”) (quoting ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND 
DAMAGES 1 (6th ed. 2000)). 
84 Describing a plaintiff as “coming to court” in a 16th century equitable action may be 
inaccurate.  Heriot, supra note 11, at 926.  “After all, during the reign of Henry VIII, the 
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subvenit (equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights),85 
laches is a flexible doctrine that has no fixed time for the barring of a 
claim.86   
The United States inherited the equitable defense of laches and the 
dual law/equity court system from England, but merged the two in 
1938. 87  This merger was due in part to American dissatisfaction with the 
discretionary nature and power of equity courts.88  The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure created one action known as a civil action, giving the 
federal courts both legal and equitable powers.89 
When modern courts allow the defense of laches, the three elements 
established by common law serve as a guide.90  First, the defendant must 
show an unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff before filing 
                                                                                                             
typical, well informed individual might not have considered equity courts to be courts, just 
as many persons during our time do not consider administrative agencies to be courts.”  Id. 
85 Ivani, 103 F.3d at 259. 
86 Thomas G. Robinson, Note, Laches in Federal Substantive Law:  Relation to Statutes of 
Limitations, 56 B.U. L. REV. 970 (1976).  “Because equitable relief is more a matter of grace 
than of right and because historically equity had no statute of limitations, courts hearing 
these claims evaluate the circumstances of the parties before deciding whether the plaintiff 
should be barred from bringing his action.”  Id.  The flexibility inherent in equitable 
defenses such as laches can arguably help a court more closely carry out the will of 
Congress.  See CAMPBELL, supra note 12, at 15.  Campbell argues that courts’ equitable 
powers are valuable methods for solving separation of powers issues.  Id.  Campbell argues 
that the Supreme Court has restricted courts’ equitable powers too severely and an 
opportunity to “benefit from an inherent judicial advantage” has been lost.  Id. 
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 2.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 merged equitable and legal actions 
into one form of action known as “the civil action.”  Id.  The rule states, “There is one form 
of action––the civil action.”  Id. 
88 Joseph H. Beale, Equity in America, 1 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 22–23 (1921).  Pre–merger, 
equity was an unpopular “method of applying law,” and the equity courts were seen as 
“royalist persons administering the law of an effete monarchy.”  Id.  See Edward Yorio, A 
Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201 (1990).  Further, the merger did not quell 
all criticisms of the flexible equitable doctrines.  Id.  “The merger of courts of law and 
equity has left an enduring legacy of debate about the survival of equitable doctrines in 
merged judicial systems.”  Id.  One argument against equitable defenses is that historically 
the English Chancellor was ecclesiastic and because of his religious background, he 
adjudicated disputes on moral rather than legal principles.  Id. at 1205–06.  Since law and 
equity merged, it is “indefensible” for a judge to apply different standards of morality 
depending upon which type of claim she is deciding.  Id. at 1206.  See also Uisdean R. Vass 
& Xia Chen, The Admiralty Doctrine of Laches, 53 LA. L. REV. 495 (1992).  Vass and Chen 
argue that criticism of the equitable doctrine of laches extends to the admiralty courts.  Id. 
at 523.  The advent of a prescriptive period for maritime personal injury and death actions 
may work against the equitable defense and result in less successful laches defenses.  Id. 
89 FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
90 LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 998.  “The essential elements of laches are well-defined by 
common law.”  Id. 
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suit.91  Second, common law requires plaintiff’s awareness of the 
infringement.92  Third, a reliance interest must result from the 
defendant’s “continued development of goodwill” during the period of 
delay.93  In other words, the defendant must show that she is prejudiced 
as a result of plaintiff’s delay.94  Plaintiff’s delay is measured from the 
time of the act of infringement on which the suit is based.95 
Delay and prejudice take a variety of forms.96  Mere proof of delay in 
bringing a suit is not enough to successfully establish a laches defense.97  
Taking time to prepare a claim and evaluate the cost of litigation is an 
example of a reasonable delay, but capitalizing on an infringer’s labor to 
see if the endeavor will be profitable is an unreasonable delay.98  Judge 
Learned Hand famously wrote that for a plaintiff to engage in this type 
of delay is to “speculate without risk.”99  Prejudice to a defendant might 
take the form of evidentiary loss like the death of witnesses or misplaced 
documents.100  Prejudice can also take the form of economic loss when a 
defendant continues to invest in a project, but might have acted 
differently if a plaintiff would have pursued her claim promptly.101  This 
fact-intensive, two-step laches analysis is unlike the application of a fixed 
statute of limitations which simply requires the rigid application of a 
                                                 
91 Id.  See also 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 125 (2008).  Unreasonable delay is stated in some 
courts as a lack of diligence or neglect and resulting prejudice is stated as “injury, injustice, 
or condition, that results from the delay to the defending party.”  Id.  Further, courts may 
apply laches if the delay was “negligent, unjustifiable, unreasonable or inexcusable, or 
unconscionable.”  Id. 
92 LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 998. 
93  Id. 
94 Id.; supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text (discussing prejudice and delay). 
95  NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.06 (B)(1). 
96 Id. § 12.06 (B)(3).  See Ruga, supra note 35, at 665–68 for a discussion of various 
examples of prejudice and delay for the purposes of laches. 
97 Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30–31 (1951). 
98 Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
99 Id.  Judge Learned Hand also noted the flexibility of equity and explained why delay 
in a copyright claim is especially unjust: 
Equity will control its peculiar remedy of an account of profits 
according to its own sense of justice.  It must be obvious to every one 
[sic] familiar with equitable principles that it is inequitable for the 
owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended infringement, to 
stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large sums of 
money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation 
has proved a success.  Delay under such circumstances allows the 
owner to speculate without risk with the other's money; he cannot 
possibly lose, and he may win. 
Id. 
100 NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.05(B)(2). 
101 Id. 
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deadline.102  Below is a discussion of how statutes of limitations interact 
with the defense of laches to create a possible tension with the separation 
of powers doctrine.103 
C. Laches, Statutes of Limitations, and the Separation of Powers 
Unlike the doctrine of laches, which has no fixed time periods, 
statutes of limitations establish clear deadlines.104  The benefits of rigid 
time limits for claims, as opposed to discretionary equitable doctrines 
like laches, is that a statute of limitations provides certainty and 
predictability.105  However, the interaction of statutes of limitations and 
the equitable defense of laches has not been certain or predictable since 
the merger of law and equity.106  Pre-merger, the defense of laches was 
available only in a court of equity, while a statute of limitations was 
                                                 
102 CAMPBELL, supra note 12 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each branch 
of government and analyzing which branch of government is most appropriate to handle 
certain disputes); Heriot, supra note 11, at 926 (discussing the rule–based rigid qualities of 
statutes of limitations compared to the flexibility of laches).  Campbell notes that equity 
affords courts the ability to fit statutes to difficult circumstances.  CAMPBELL, supra note 12, 
at 15.   
A fundamental reason we have judges with broad discretion, rather 
than ministerial magistrates applying legislatively set rules 
unwaveringly, is because we recognize broad rules don’t always fit 
specific circumstances . . . Congress could establish an absolute rule of 
no retrospective application or an absolute rule of retrospective 
application; but an absolute rule loses the advantage of individual 
accommodation. 
Id. 
103 See supra Part II.C (comparing statutes of limitations with laches and discussing the 
position some courts take that the operation of laches may violate separation of powers 
principles). 
104 Although the doctrine of laches and statutes of limitations are different, they share the 
same goal of limiting the amount of time a plaintiff may bring a claim.  See Heriot, supra 
note 11, at 921.  “They [doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations] are two differing 
legal formulations designed to deal with the same underlying legal concern—that at some 
point a plaintiff’s cause of action ought to perish for lack of timeliness.”  Id. 
105 Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1997). 
106 LAYCOCK, supra note 16.  Remedies are classified as legal or equitable, but the line 
between them is “jagged and not especially functional” as a result of the bureaucratic “fight 
for turf” that occurred when law and equity merged.  Id.  Laycock notes: 
 Where the law/equity distinction is especially murky, . . . lawyers 
and judges tend to overlook it, and the distinction becomes less and 
less important.  Where the distinction is written into substantive law, 
judges have trouble applying it. . . .  Perhaps the proper lesson from 
Mertens and Great-West is that courts and legislatures should quit using 
law and equity as doctrinal or statutory categories. 
Id. at 7–8 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) and Great-West Life 
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 122 S. Ct. 708 (2002) in which the Court produced different 5-
4 splits on the meaning of “equitable remedies” in Congressional legislation). 
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applied only in a court of law.107  In modern courts, the equitable 
defenses of estoppel, waiver, and unconscionability are available 
whether the relief plaintiff seeks is equitable or legal in nature.108  The 
“conventional wisdom” is that the laches defense is only available if a 
plaintiff seeks equitable relief.109  However, case law both inside and 
outside the copyright context reveals that this conventional wisdom is 
accepted by some courts and flatly rejected by others.110 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the interaction 
between laches and statutes of limitations.111  In a case regarding the 
Federal Farm Loan Act, the Court noted that a federal statute of 
limitations is definitive.112  In a 1937 pre-merger decision, the Court 
stated that “laches within a statute of limitations is no defense at law,”113 
and the Court reaffirmed the statement in a 1985 decision.114  However, 
                                                 
107 Id. at 959.  The equitable defenses of laches and unclean hands were available only in 
equity before the merger.  Id.  The chancellors made some equitable defenses, such as 
fraud, available at law by enjoining the opposing litigant from pursuing his claim.  Id.  See 
also Heriot, supra note 11, at 926.  As for statutes of limitations applying to equitable claims, 
it is helpful to look to history.  Id.  The model for the first statutes of limitations adopted by 
American legislatures was the Statute of James I passed by Parliament in 1623.  Id.  The 
existence of equity courts is not acknowledged in the statute, and it is doubtful that 
members of Parliament believed that statutes of limitations would ever cover matters in 
equity.  Id. 
108 LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 959. 
109 Id. at 960.  “The conventional wisdom is that unclean hands and laches are available 
only if plaintiff seeks equitable relief.  This conventional wisdom is not exactly false, but it 
is misleading.”  Id.; Robinson, supra note 86, at 970 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 
392, 395 (1946)).  “If the cause of action is based upon a federally created right for which 
Congress has provided a limitations period, the court will apply the congressionally 
mandated limitation.”  Robinson, supra note 86, at 973. 
110 LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003. 
When an equitable claim is subject to a statute of limitations, laches is 
irrelevant unless it bars the claim before the limitations period 
expires. . . .  It is rare to bar a claim for laches before an applicable 
statute of limitations has run on a one–time event; some cases say it 
just can’t happen.  
Id. 
111 Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463–64 (1947); Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395; United States 
v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935).  “Laches within the term of the statute of limitations is no 
defense at law.”  Mack, 295 U.S. at 489; see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 
470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (arguably reaffirming the pre-merger holding in Mack by 
noting in dicta that “[a]pplication of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law 
would be novel indeed”). 
112 Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395.  The court noted in dicta that “[i]f Congress explicitly puts a 
limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter.  The 
Congressional statute of limitation is definitive.”  Id. 
113 Mack, 295 U.S. at 489. 
114 County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 244 n.16. 
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this guidance from the Court has not resolved the issue.115  Some circuits 
in the copyright circuit split hold that laches may bar both legal and 
equitable relief before the statute of limitations runs.116  Others maintain 
that out of deference to the separation of powers, only equitable 
remedies may be barred by laches, but never before the statute of 
limitations runs.117  Still others hold that to bar either type of relief within 
a federal statute of limitations would violate the separation of powers 
doctrine.118 
Copyright cases are not the only disputes concerning laches and 
separation of powers principles.119  Cases outside the copyright context 
stand for the proposition that allowing laches to shorten a statute of 
limitations violates the separation of powers,120 while other courts 
patently reject the idea. 121  Below is a discussion of decisions from inside 
and outside the context of the Copyright Act that address the notion that 
an application of laches could violate the separation of powers.122 
                                                 
115 LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003 (noting the split of authority). 
116 See infra Part II.C. 
117 See infra Part II.C. 
118 See infra Part II.C (discussing laches approaches both inside and outside the copyright 
circuit split).  The separation of powers concept is summarized by the Supreme Court: 
While the Constitution of the United States divides all power conferred 
upon the Federal Government into “legislative Powers,” Art. I, § 1, 
“[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, § 1, and “[t]he judicial Power,” Art. III, 
§ 1, it does not attempt to define those terms . . . .  Obviously, then, the 
Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of powers depends 
largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate 
to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.  In The Federalist No. 48, 
Madison expressed the view that “[i]t is not infrequently a question of 
real nicety in legislative bodies whether the operation of a particular 
measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere,” 
whereas “the executive power [is] restrained within a narrower 
compass and . . . more simple in its nature,” and “the judiciary [is] 
described by landmarks still less uncertain.” 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). 
119 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the availability of laches in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)). 
120 United States v. Rodriguez–Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2001) (criminal 
proceeding); Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164 (8th Cir. 1995), 
abrogated on other grounds by Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(reasoning that separation of powers principles prevent courts from shortening statutes of 
limitations); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that 
laches is available because no express statute of limitations exists). 
121 Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 
881 (7th Cir. 2002). 
122 See infra Parts II.C.1–2. 
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1. The Availability of Laches in Title VII, ADEA, and ERISA Cases 
The Eighth Circuit has not addressed whether laches is available as 
an affirmative defense in copyright claims filed within the federal statute 
of limitations period, but the circuit has addressed the laches issue in the 
context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Civil Rights Act”).123  
In Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., a female worker sued her 
employer for gender and age discrimination.124  The court held that 
laches should not bar a claim in an action with an express statute of 
limitations established by Congress.125  Relying on a string of cases from 
the Supreme Court and other federal circuits, the court held that laches 
was not available within a statute of limitations and reasoned that 
separation of powers principles mandated their conclusion.126 
Similarly, the Second Circuit addressed the availability of laches as 
an affirmative defense in the context of the Civil Rights Act.127  There, a 
contracting company owned by Italian males challenged a state law 
preferentially awarding contracts to businesses substantially owned by 
minorities or females.128  The lower court held that laches barred 
plaintiff’s claims, and the appellate court reversed.129  The Second Circuit 
stated that the “prevailing rule” is that laches cannot bar a federal 
statutory claim seeking legal relief where the action is filed within the 
express statute of limitations.130  The court relied on separation of powers 
concerns in reaching its ban on laches.131 
                                                 
123  Ashley, 66 F.3d 164.  Abrogating Ashley, the court in Madison held that in a hostile 
environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff may recover for the entire period that the 
hostile environment existed.  Madison, 330 F.3d at 1057.  This abrogated the rule in Ashley 
that for continuing violations, the plaintiff could only recover for the two years prior to 
filing the charge.  Id. 
124 66 F.3d at 166. 
125 Id. at 169. 
126 Id. at 168–70 (citing FDIC v. Fuller, 994 F.2d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 1993); Miller v. 
Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994); 
United States v. RePass, 688 F.2d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 1982); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 674 
F.2d 379, 388 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds by 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(“[A]lthough the equitable part of a mixed [section 1983] claim can be barred by laches, the 
legal part will be barred only by the statute of limitations . . . .”); Thropp v. Bache Halsey 
Stuart Shields, Inc. 650 F.2d 817, 822 (6th Cir. 1981); Sun Oil Co. v. Fleming, 469 F.2d 211, 
213–14 (10th Cir. 1972); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1969); Straley v. 
Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1961)). 
127 Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 1997). 
128 Id. at 258. 
129 Id. at 262. 
130 Id. at 260. 
131 Id.  “The prevailing rule, then, is that when a plaintiff brings a federal statutory claim 
seeking legal relief, laches cannot bar that claim, at least where the statute contains an 
express limitations period within which the action is timely.”  Id. 
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In the context of another federal law with an express statute of 
limitations, the ADEA, the Ninth Circuit held that the doctrine of laches 
is inapplicable when Congress provides a statute of limitations.132  There, 
a female employee’s ADEA claims were barred by laches in the lower 
court.133  The Ninth Circuit reversed and stated that the doctrine of 
laches was unavailable because Congress explicitly provided a statute of 
limitations to govern all ADEA actions.134 
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit calls the argument that a court’s use 
of laches might conflict with the separation of powers doctrine “odd.”135  
In a case under ERISA, the court reasoned that just as equitable estoppel 
and equitable tolling may lengthen a statute of limitations, laches may 
operate to shorten it.136  Although ERISA does not have an express 
statute of limitations, the court expanded its reasoning to cover federal 
laws which do have express limits.137  The court noted further that laches 
may operate to shorten a statute of limitations regardless of whether the 
suit is at law or equity because the defense is available at law.138  This 
dispute over the application of laches does not arise only in the context 
of the Civil Rights Act, ADEA, and ERISA.  It also extends to the heart of 
the circuit split regarding laches and the Copyright Act.139 
                                                 
132 Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1109 (1994)). 
133 Id. at 584. 
134 Id. at 586. 
135 Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 
881 (7th Cir. 2002). 
136 Id. at 881–82.  “What is sauce for the goose (the plaintiff seeking to extend the statute 
of limitations) is sauce for the gander (the defendant seeking to contract it).”  Id. at 882.  
Although ERISA does not have an express statute of limitations, the court addressed the 
question of when laches could apply within the statute of limitations whether it was a 
borrowed analogous state statute of limitations or an express one found in the statute itself.  
Id. at 881. 
For purposes of this appeal, therefore, it’s as if ERISA contained a (10-
year) statute of limitations; and this raised the question (not discussed 
by the parties) when if ever laches can be used to shorten a statute of 
limitations.  It turns out that just as various tolling doctrines can be 
used to lengthen the period for suit specified in a statute of limitations, 
so laches can be used to contract it. . . .  This is regardless of whether 
the suit is at law or in equity, because, as with many equitable 
defenses, the defense of laches is equally available in suits at law. 
Id. (citing Hutchinson v. Spanierman, 190 F.3d 815, 823 (7th Cir. 1999); Hot Wax, Inc. v. 
Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 822 (7th Cir. 1999); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides 
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc)). 
137 Id. at 881–82. 
138 Id. at 881. 
139 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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2. The Availability of Laches in Copyright Cases 
The Fourth Circuit relies on separation of powers principles to 
completely bar the use of laches to shorten the statute of limitations 
found in the Copyright Act.140  While the Fourth Circuit stands alone 
with its complete ban on laches, it is not alone on the separation of 
powers issue.141  The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits allow laches to 
restrict the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations in rare cases, but each 
circuit agrees with the Fourth Circuit that doing so raises separation of 
powers concerns.142  The Ninth stands alone as the only circuit that both 
allows the application of laches to bar timely claims and excludes 
separation of powers principles from the laches analysis.143 
a. Circuits Banning or Restricting Laches in Copyright Claims Based on 
Separation of Powers Principles 
In 2001, the Fourth Circuit ruled on a case involving Lyons 
Partnership (“Lyons”), the owner of intellectual property rights in 
Barney, a large purple dinosaur who appears in various products 
marketed to children. 144  Lyons sued a costume shop for copyright 
infringement. 145  Although four years passed between the moment the 
plaintiff knew of the infringement and the time the claim was filed, the 
court held that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations or 
laches.146  The court reasoned that each new costume rental represented a 
new infringement, so all costume rentals that took place during the three 
                                                 
140 Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001).  Specifically, the 
court wrote: 
[W]hen considering the timeliness of a cause of action brought 
pursuant to a statute for which Congress has provided a limitations 
period, a court should not apply laches to overrule the legislature’s 
judgment as to the appropriate time limit to apply for actions brought 
under the statute.  Separation of powers principles thus preclude us 
from applying the judicially created doctrine of laches to bar a federal 
statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of 
limitations. 
Id. at 798. 
141 See infra Part II.C.2.a (discussing separation of powers analysis in Fourth, Sixth, Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuit decisions). 
142 See infra Part II.C.2.a. 
143 See infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing separation of powers analysis in the Ninth Circuit). 
144  Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 794.   
145 Id. at 795.  Lyons claimed that three costumes being rented by the shop under names 
such as “Hillary the Purple Hippopotamus,” and “Duffy the Dragon” looked like Barney 
and lead children to believe the costumes were Barney.  Id. at 795–96.  The lawsuit also 
included claims of trademark infringement.  Id. 
146 Id. at 797. 
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years prior to the filing of the claim were not barred by the statute of 
limitations.147  In regards to the laches claim, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the equitable remedy could not bar the claim because separation of 
powers principles prevented the courts from using equitable rules to bar 
statutorily-timely claims.148  The court reasoned that using a judicially-
created doctrine to override a legislative enactment would overstep the 
court’s authority.149 
In 2006, a United States District Court in North Carolina applied the 
Fourth Circuit’s new ban on laches in a copyright infringement claim.150  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the plaintiff received royalties for each episode of 
the television series Dukes of Hazzard because the show was based on his 
life and the lives of his family in Union County, North Carolina.151  Other 
Dukes of Hazzard products were released in the 1980s, including two 
made-for-television movies and a Saturday morning cartoon series.152  
The plaintiff did not challenge the release of those products.153  On 
August 5, 2005, Defendants released The Dukes of Hazzard feature film, 
and Plaintiff filed his copyright infringement suit in November.154  
Although the plaintiff was aware of Dukes of Hazzard products, such as 
cartoons and television movies over twenty years before the feature film 
release, the court applied the holding from Lyons and ruled that laches 
was inapplicable in Fourth Circuit copyright infringement claims.155  The 
statute of limitations period began to run anew with the feature film 
release, and the plaintiff filed the claim well within the three-year period 
allowed by statute.156 
                                                 
147 Id.  The lower court erred when it ruled that multiple rentals of costumes all infringing 
on the same copyrighted dinosaur character constituted one act of infringement.  Id.  The 
court ruled that “each sale or rental should be considered separately under an infringement 
analysis.”  Id. 
148 Id.  The court also noted that laches does not apply to copyright infringement claims 
because the doctrine only bars equitable actions and does not apply to actions at law.  Id.  
The court suggested that the separation of powers violation was the more overriding 
concern.  Id.  The court wrote that even if laches could apply to legal actions, separation of 
powers principles would still bar the doctrine from shortening federally mandated statutes 
of limitations.  Id. 
149 Id. at 798. 
150 Rushing v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 3:05CV474-H, 2006 WL 517674 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 
2006). 
151 Id. at *1. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at *2. 
156 Id. 
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In 2002, the Tenth Circuit ruled on the issue.157  Plaintiff, Dr. 
Jacobsen, a former prisoner of war in the Philippines and Japan during 
World War II, wrote a memoir about his experiences.158  A writer by the 
name of Dr. Hughes requested a meeting with Dr. Jacobsen in 1994.159  
Dr. Hughes claimed he wanted to gather information about the war in 
the Pacific for use in a series of fictional books and got a copy of Dr. 
Jacobsen’s memoir.160  Dr. Jacobsen received a portion of Dr. Hughes’ 
new book in 1996, but claimed he did not see any infringing material at 
that time.161  Dr. Jacobsen claimed he discovered the allegedly infringing 
material when the book was published in 1997, and he filed suit in 
1999.162  The district court held that laches barred Dr. Jacobsen’s claim 
because he had an opportunity to let Dr. Hughes know of his 
disapproval as early as 1994 and no later than 1996.163  The Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.164  The court reasoned that 
because Dr. Jacobsen filed his claim within three years of the publication 
of Dr. Hughes’ book, the court should defer to the three-year statute of 
limitations found in the Copyright Act.165  Whether Dr. Jacobsen knew of 
the infringement prior to publication of the defendant’s book was in 
dispute.166  The court relied on an earlier Tenth Circuit case, United States 
v. Rodriguez-Aguirre,167 for the proposition that a statute of limitations 
may be cut short by the doctrine of laches, but that it is only possible in 
                                                 
157 Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002). 
158 Id. at 940.  Plaintiff, Dr. Jacobsen, writes about surviving a Bataan Death March and 
years of imprisonment and torture in work camps.  Id.  He also describes his harrowing 
journey to reach American troops after the war ended.  Id. at 946.  Dr. Jacobsen describes 
boarding a ship in an attempt to leave Japan: 
Approaching the sailors the second time, one of the fellows drove his 
souvenir sword into the deck of the ship and said somewhat fiercely, 
“Listen you guys!  General MacArthur said that we had the authority to 
use any means of transportation necessary to get out of Japan, and this 
boat is necessary for us to reach American troops.  We are going to get 
across this bay with you or without you.  If you want to take us across and 
get paid for your troubles, fine.  If you don’t get off the ship, and we’ll take 
ourselves across!” 
Id. 
159 Id. at 949. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 949–50. 
162 Id. at 940. 
163 Id. at 949. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 950. 
166 Id. at 949.  Further, the district court erred when it made a factual determination 
regarding laches.  Id. 
167 264 F.3d 1195, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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rare cases.168  The court reasoned that the separation of powers doctrine 
constrained its ability to use a judicially-created equitable defense to 
truncate a legislative enactment, and where possible, the court should 
defer to the express limitations period.169 
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit ruled on the issue.170  Although the court 
did not go so far as to bar the availability of laches in a statutorily-timely 
claim, the court severely restricted the use of the doctrine and discussed 
separation of powers concerns.171  In Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, 
Inc., plaintiffs sought destruction of a condominium complex that 
allegedly infringed on their copyrighted design.172  While destruction of 
copies is a remedy available under the Copyright Act173 and plaintiffs 
filed their claim two and a half years after discovering the infringement, 
the court declined to allow destruction of the buildings.174  After a 
lengthy review of cases on equity and the separation of powers, the court 
held that laches may bar relief that would work an unjust hardship upon 
the defendants or upon innocent third parties.175  However, claims filed 
within the statute of limitations are afforded a presumption that the 
plaintiff’s delay in bringing the suit is reasonable.176  Ultimately, the 
court awarded monetary damages and injunctive relief.177 
                                                 
168 Id. at 951. 
169 Id.  The separation of powers doctrine was central to the court’s reasoning.  Id.  In 
deciding that Dr Jacobsen’s case was simply not one of the rare situations that could justify 
shortening Congress’s express time limitation, the court looked to the Fourth Circuit for 
guidance.  Id.  The court noted that the Fourth Circuit held that “separation of powers 
principles dictate that an equitable timeliness rule adopted by courts cannot bar claims that 
are brought within the legislatively prescribed statute of limitations” in the Copyright Act.  
Id.  The court also relied on authority from a prior Tenth Circuit case noting: 
Because laches is a judicially created equitable doctrine, whereas 
statutes of limitations are legislative enactments, it has been observed 
that in deference to the doctrine of the separation of powers, the 
Supreme Court has been circumspect in adopting principles of equity 
in the context of enforcing federal statutes.  Accordingly, when a 
limitation on the period for bringing suit has been set by statute, laches 
will generally not be invoked to shorten the statutory period. 
Id. 
170  Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007). 
171 Id. at 232–33. 
172  Id. at 229. 
173 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006). 
174 Chirco, 474 F.3d at 236. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 233.  The court reasoned that several reasons justified using the statutory period 
as the laches period.  Id.  The court wrote: 
It enhances the stability and clarity of the law by applying neutral 
rules and principles in an evenhanded fashion rather than making the 
question purely discretionary.  It also requires courts to make clear 
distinctions between threshold or special defenses or pleas in bar and 
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In July of 2008, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of laches in 
copyright claims.178  The case concerned a dispute over the Church of 
Scientology’s use of a former member’s marketing book.179  Citing 
separation of powers concerns, the court held that laches may only be 
applied to statutorily-timely claims in extraordinary circumstances, and 
even then, only to bar retrospective damages.180  The court noted that it 
was “mindful” of separation of powers principles and held there is a 
strong presumption that a plaintiff’s suit is timely if filed before the 
statute of limitations expires.181 
b. Ninth Circuit:  Separation of Powers Doctrine Does Not Affect Laches 
Analysis in Copyright Claims 
Five months after the Fourth Circuit held that applying laches to a 
statutorily-timely claim violates the separation of powers doctrine, the 
Ninth Circuit disagreed.182  In August of 2001, the Ninth Circuit ruled on 
the availability of laches as an affirmative defense in copyright claims 
filed before the limitations period expires.183  In a case concerning rights 
to the famous James Bond character, the court held that laches barred the 
claim in its entirety, including prospective injunctions for future 
infringement.184  Key to the court’s reasoning was the fact that the 
                                                                                                             
the merits of the case.  It enhances the rationality and objectivity of the 
process by preventing courts from short circuiting difficult issues on 
the merits by confusing or conflating the merits of an action with other 
defenses. 
Id. (citing Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362, 365 (6th Cir. 1985). 
177 Id. at 236. 
178 Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287 
(11th Cir. 2008). 
179 Id. at 1293.  For a thorough summary and commentary on Letterese, see Brittany 
Adkins, Eleventh Circuit:  Survey of Recent Decisions, Defense of Laches in Copyright 
Infringement ActionPeter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 
Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008), 39 CUMB. L. REV. 819, 855 (2008–2009). 
180 Id. at 1321. 
181 Id. at 1320. 
182 Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2001). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 959.  The opinion mimics the tone of the James Bond films and uses quotes from 
the movies to symbolize the competing views of laches.  Id. at 947.  The opinion begins with 
the epitaph for Mrs. Bond, “We have all the time in the world,” and a quote from the Bond 
Film, “Equity aids the vigilant.”  Id. at 946–47.  Further, to demonstrate that the case at bar 
was one of the extraordinary cases that called for a complete bar by the doctrine of laches, 
the court characterizes the legal battle in terms of spy drama.  Id. at 947.  The court states: 
 Every so often, the law shakes off its cobwebs to produce a story 
far too improbable even for the silver screen—too fabulous even for 
the world of Agent 007.  This is one of those occasions, for the case 
before us has it all.  A hero, seeking to redeem his stolen fortune.  The 
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alleged infringements on the James Bond character involved movie 
releases and DVD re-releases over many years.185  The court reasoned 
that because the infringements had occurred over a lengthy period of 
time and were so similar in nature, they should be treated as one 
infringement for the purposes of laches analysis.186  The court barred the 
entire claim and did not include any mention of the separation of powers 
doctrine in the opinion.187 
With one circuit holding that laches may bar a statutorily-timely 
claim in its entirety,188 one circuit banning laches in timely claims due to 
a separation of powers violation,189 and two others limiting the use of 
laches,190 the circuit split presents a widening dilemma.  If the James 
Bond case occurred in the Fourth Circuit where laches is unavailable to 
bar relief within three years of an infringement, the plaintiff might have 
prevailed and won an injunction to halt the DVD re-release.191  Congress 
intended to eliminate differing time limitations on claims when they 
                                                                                                             
villainous organization that stands in his way.  Mystery!  International 
intrigue!  And now, not least of all, the dusty corners of the ancient law 
of equity.   
 More specifically, this case arises out of an almost forty–year 
dispute over the parentage and ownership of a cultural phenomenon:  
Bond.  James Bond.  We are confronted with two competing narratives, 
with little in common but their endpoint.  All agree that James Bond—
the roguish British secret agent known for martinis (shaken, not 
stirred), narrow escapes, and a fondness for fetching paramours with 
risqué sobriquets—is one of the great commercial successes of the 
modern cinema.  The parties dispute, however, the source from which 
Agent 007 sprang. 
Id. 
185 Id. at 954. 
186 Id.  The court explained: 
The perfect overlap between the alleged infringements in the DVD re-
releases and the original movies requires us to treat them the same for 
purposes of laches, regardless of the statute of limitations. . . .  Here, it 
has simply been alleged that DVDs “and other new media” contain the 
same infringing elements as the movies that they reproduce.  In this 
situation, the new medium and the old should be treated as one. 
Id. 
187 Id. at 942.  Separation of powers principles are not mentioned anywhere in the 
opinion.  
188 Id. at 955. 
189 Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001). 
190  Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that laches 
may bar relief within statutory period when relief sought will create an unjust hardship 
upon the defendants or upon innocent third parties); Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. 
World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that laches 
may bar only retrospective damages in extraordinary circumstances). 
191 See Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 798. 
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placed a statute of limitations in the Copyright Act.192  Without a 
resolution, the circuit split threatens to destroy the uniformity that the 
statute of limitations was enacted to create.193 
III.  ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS TO THE COPYRIGHT CIRCUIT 
SPLIT 
Congress placed a three-year statute of limitations in the Copyright 
Act to prevent forum shopping and create uniformity in the courts.194  
The statute of limitations provision has failed to bring about the 
uniformity that both Congress and the Framers of the Constitution 
intended.195  To establish more uniform time limitations in the context of 
copyright claims, Congress needs to amend the Copyright Act, and this 
Note offers a combination of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ approaches 
that would best resolve the circuit split.196  First, Part III of this Note will 
analyze three possible amendments to the Copyright Act.197  Part III.A 
will analyze an amendment codifying the approach taken by the Fourth 
Circuit to completely bar the use of laches in timely copyright claims.198  
Part III.B will analyze an amendment codifying the approach taken by 
the Sixth Circuit to afford a presumption of timeliness to claims filed 
within the statutory period and permit the defense of laches when relief 
would work an unjust hardship on the defendants or innocent third 
parties.199  Part III.C will analyze an amendment codifying the approach 
taken by the Ninth Circuit allowing laches to bar both past and 
prospective relief in cases of similar infringements.200 
                                                 
192 See supra note 58 and accompanying text discussing Congress’s intent to create 
uniformity and eliminate forum shopping by enacting a three-year statute of limitations in 
the Copyright Act. 
193 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the conflicting approaches taken to time limitations in 
copyright cases). 
196 See infra Part IV for the author’s proposed amendment. 
197 See infra Parts III.A–C (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the three 
approaches taken in the copyright circuit split). 
198 See infra Part III.A. 
199 See infra Part III.B. 
200 See infra Part III.C. 
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A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach:  A Flat Ban on Laches within the Statutory 
Period 
The Fourth Circuit took the approach of banning the defense of 
laches.201  Codifying the Copyright Act to reflect a ban on the equitable 
defense of laches within the statutory period would create uniformity, 
but the court’s reasoning regarding the separation of powers is flawed 
and would overly restrict the equitable powers of the court.202 
First, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning regarding laches and the 
separation of powers is flawed.203  The court reasoned that Congress 
intended copyright plaintiffs to have three years to file suit for each 
infringement and to allow anything less would be acting contrary to 
congressional intent.204  However, amending the Copyright Act to bar 
laches would eliminate an invaluable tool that aids the courts in carrying 
out the will of Congress.205  With repeated violations of similar copyright 
infringements, laches is especially helpful in carrying out Congress’s 
intent to limit copyright claims.206  Without laches in cases of continuing 
                                                 
201 See supra Part II.C.2.a (discussing the facts, holding, and reasoning of the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision). 
202 See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text (discussing the certainty and 
predictability provided by statutes of limitations).  The Sixth Circuit criticized the Fourth 
Circuit’s ban on laches within the statute of limitations.  Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 
474 F.3d 227, 232–33 (6th Cir. 2007).  The court wrote “[W]e conclude that a flat proscription 
such as that invoked by the Fourth Circuit against the defense of laches in cases involving a 
federal statutory claim is both unnecessary and unwise.”  Id. at 233–34. 
203 See supra Part II.C.2.a for a discussion of the reasoning each circuit uses in laches 
analysis. 
204 Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2001).  Specifically, 
the court wrote that “because laches is a judicially created doctrine, whereas statutes of 
limitations are legislative enactments, it has been observed that ‘[i]n deference to the 
doctrine of separation of powers, the [Supreme] Court has been circumspect in adopting 
principles of equity in the context of enforcing federal statutes.’”  Id. at 789 (citing County 
of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part)). 
205 See CAMPBELL, supra note 12 (arguing that courts’ equitable powers can actually 
provide a method for resolving separation of powers issues and aid the court in 
conforming a statute to different factual scenarios). 
206 The Ninth Circuit case in the copyright circuit split concerned a long series of 
copyright infringements, and the court rightly decided that even though technically the 
statute of limitations had not run, the plaintiff had impermissibly delayed in bringing suit.  
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2001).  The court described the 
extremely long time lapse: 
On the substance of the laches issue, the court concluded that 
McClory had known of the alleged infringement since at least 
1961, and that his only suit to enforce any rights against Danjaq 
was the 1976 litigation, which was unrelated to the claims 
presented here.  Thus, there had been a delay of at least twenty-
one years—and more likely, thirty-six years—between 
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copyright violations, courts would be forced to allow a result that 
Congress surely did not intend—a plaintiff could wait for twenty years 
while her design is repeatedly copied only to bring suit once the 
infringements became profitable.207  This scenario represents exactly the 
type of impermissible speculation with other’s money that Judge 
Learned Hand warned against.208 
Further, one traditional understanding of laches is that the defense 
may operate independently of a statute of limitations with the ability to 
cut it short.209  While the Supreme Court has recognized that an exercise 
of equitable powers could violate the separation of powers doctrine, 
using laches to tailor just relief in extraordinary circumstances does not 
constitute the type of judicial power grab the Court has warned 
against.210  A separation of powers issue could possibly be a concern if a 
court allowed laches to bar both legal and equitable relief in the case of a 
                                                                                                             
McClory’s knowledge of the potential claims and the initiation 
of litigation. 
Id. 
207 See supra Part II.A (discussing Congress’s intent to limit the amount of time a plaintiff 
has to file a copyright claim). 
208 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Learned Hand’s famous 
characterization of delay in a copyright infringement case as speculation without risk). 
209 See supra note 7 (discussing Judge Posner’s view that laches may shorten statutes of 
limitations just as equitable tolling doctrines can lengthen the time for a claim to be filed).  
Contra DOBBS, supra note 1, at 103.  Dobbs writes that the “traditional function suggests that 
laches should be limited to cases in which no statute of limitations applies.” Id. 
210 See supra note 8 (discussing Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131–32 (1995) in which he states that separation of powers principles 
are a restraint on the courts’ equitable powers).  Although Justice Thomas recognizes that a 
court could use equitable powers in such a way as to violate the separation of powers 
doctrine, he does so in an extreme case.  See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131–32 (1995).  
In Jenkins, the Court addressed a situation in which a district court retained jurisdiction and 
became too involved in supervising a school desegregation plan.  Id. at 74–75.  The Court 
held that the district court overstepped its authority when fashioning a remedy for past 
legally-mandated segregation.  Id. at 87–88.  The district court ordered salary increases for 
teachers which was “grounded in remedying the vestiges of segregation by improving the 
desegregative attractiveness” of the school district.  Id. at 80.  Justice Thomas suggested the 
court breached the doctrine of federalism when it started “running school systems.”  Id.  at 
132–33.  The example he gave of a court potentially using its equitable powers in violation 
of the separation of powers doctrine was a court “running Executive Branch agencies.”  Id. 
at 133.  The extreme examples Thomas used of a court overstepping its authority are easily 
distinguishable from a situation in which a court uses laches to refuse the extraordinary 
relief of destroying a building as it did in the Sixth Circuit.  See id.  The example of a court 
running a school is also easily distinguishable and much less drastic than a court using 
laches to refuse relief in a situation in which a copyright infringement has gone on for 
decades.  Id. 
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one-time infringement that was also absent compelling circumstances.211  
This is a rare event and has yet to occur in the copyright circuit split 
cases.212  In the context of the copyright circuit split, each time laches 
shortened a statute of limitations, it only barred extraordinary legal relief 
or, in the case of continuing copyright infringements that occurred over 
the span of thirty years, barred all relief.213  To quote the Sixth Circuit, 
the Fourth Circuit’s flat ban on laches within the statutory period is 
“unnecessary and unwise.”214 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Approach:  A Presumption of Timeliness 
Another possible resolution to the copyright circuit split is to amend 
the Copyright Act and codify the Sixth Circuit’s approach.215  The 
approach taken by the Sixth Circuit is to allow laches within the 
statutory period in unusual circumstances, but to create a presumption 
that the defense does not apply if the claim is filed before the limitations 
period ends.216  The main justification for this approach is that it offers a 
balance between the competing objectives of deferring to Congress’s 
power to set strict time limitations while also deferring to courts’ 
traditional equitable powers, which rely on flexibility to tailor fair 
results.217  Out of deference to the separation of powers, the court in 
Chirco allowed laches to bar only equitable relief that would work an 
unjust hardship on the defendant.218  By declining to apply laches to the 
                                                 
211 LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003 (explaining that it is “rare” for laches to bar a claim 
before a statute of limitations has run on a one-time event and noting that some cases stand 
for the proposition that laches is not allowed before the time has expired). 
212 Supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the fact patterns of cases from all circuits in the copyright 
circuit split). 
213 The Sixth Circuit allowed laches to bar the equitable remedy of impounding the 
infringing building.  Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 231 (6th Cir. 2007).  
The Ninth Circuit allowed laches to bar both legal and equitable relief in the case of 
copyright infringements that had occurred over many years.  Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 
263 F.3d 942, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2001). 
214 Chirco, 474 F.3d at 234. 
215 See supra notes 170–77 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit approach 
to laches in copyright claims). 
216 See supra notes 170–77 and accompanying text.  In the Sixth Circuit there is a 
presumption that the plaintiff’s delay in filing suit was reasonable for the purposes of 
laches analysis if the claim is filed before the statute of limitations expires.  Chirco, 474 F.3d 
at 229. 
217 Chirco, 474 F.3d at 232–33.  The Sixth Circuit justifies its approach by claiming that it 
has “carved out a middle ground between the Fourth Circuit’s strict prohibition on 
application of the laches doctrine in cases involving a statute with an explicit limitations 
provision and the somewhat more expansive application of the doctrine by the Ninth 
Circuit.”  Id. 
218 Id. 
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entire claim, the Sixth Circuit’s approach gives deference to the Supreme 
Court’s admonishment that “laches within the term of the statute of 
limitations is no defense at law.”219  However, the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach may reward plaintiffs who delay in cases of continuing 
infringements.220 
Codifying the Sixth Circuit’s approach is not an acceptable 
resolution to the circuit split because in the case of continuing 
infringements, it works against the policy objective of copyright law that 
plaintiffs should not be able to speculate without risk.221   A codification 
of the Sixth Circuit’s approach would provide a presumption of 
timeliness for all claims filed within the statute of limitations.222  The 
court would presume any delay the plaintiff had in filing the claim was 
reasonable as long as the claim was filed within three years of an 
infringement, regardless of the similarity of past infringements.223  
Applying this reasoning to a continuing infringement produces an unjust 
result.224  If the facts of Chirco had been that the alleged infringers had 
built condominiums from copyrighted plans each year for ten years and 
were sued in the eleventh year, the plaintiff would still have benefitted 
from the presumption of timeliness.225  With each new building 
representing a new infringement and therefore starting the statute of 
limitations clock anew, the plaintiff’s claim would be timely and the 
defendants would have the burden of overcoming the presumption that 
the plaintiff’s delay was reasonable despite the fact that he had 
knowledge of the infringing conduct for eleven years.226  This type of 
                                                 
219 United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935). 
220 See supra notes 123–26 (discussing Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 
164 (8th Cir. 1995) where laches did not bar a claim for a harm that had been continuing 
over the course of many years). 
221 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s comments 
that it is impermissible for a plaintiff to delay in order to capitalize on an infringer’s labor). 
222 Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229.  The court noted the Sixth Circuit presumption in its holding: 
To the extent that the plaintiffs in this case are seeking only monetary 
damages and injunctive relief, we give effect to the Sixth Circuit’s 
presumption that the statute of limitations must prevail.  However, to 
the extent that the relief sought is destruction of the condominium 
complex that allegedly infringes the plaintiffs’ copyright, the facts 
before us suggest that this is indeed the extraordinary case in which 
the defense of laches is properly interposed. 
Id. 
223 Id. 
224 See infra text accompanying notes 254–60 (arguing that continuing infringements raise 
special concerns about a plaintiff’s delay in filing suit). 
225 See Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229. 
226 See id. 
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delay in bringing suit is exactly the type of delay laches guards 
against.227 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach:  Liberal Laches Application 
Another possible amendment to the Copyright Act would be a 
codification of the Ninth Circuit’s approach that laches is allowed to bar 
an entire claim within the statute of limitations and include a distinction 
regarding continuing infringements that are similar in nature.228  The 
main justification for this approach is that courts are free to use their 
equitable powers to shape relief, and a separation of powers violation is 
not a concern, especially in the context of continuing infringements.229  
The Ninth Circuit reasons that allowing laches to bar a claim that 
involves substantially similar infringements over the span of thirty-six 
years does not frustrate Congress’s intent to allow copyright plaintiffs 
three years to file a claim and could not possibly present a conflict with 
the separation of powers doctrine.230 
A distinction regarding continuing infringements is crucial to an 
amendment of the Copyright Act.  While laches should be allowed in 
copyright claims, simply clarifying this in the Act does not do enough to 
resolve the split.  The primary goal of amending the Copyright Act is to 
establish uniformity in copyright decisions, which was the intent of both 
the Framers of the Constitution and the Congress that placed the statute 
of limitations in the Act.231  The traditional understanding of courts’ 
equitable powers supports the notion that laches may shorten a statute of 
limitations, but simply acknowledging this power in the Act misses an 
opportunity to provide courts with more specific standards to apply to 
claims.232  An amendment to the Act should provide a workable, uniform 
standard so that the incentive system found in the copyright clause of 
the Constitution will continue to encourage the production of creative 
works.233 
                                                 
227 See supra note 99 (citing Judge Learned Hand’s description of one of the perils of 
laches in a copyright claim that plaintiffs may speculate without risk). 
228 Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 960 (9th Cir. 2001). 
229 See id.  Separation of powers principles are not mentioned anywhere in the opinion.  
Id. 
230 Id. 
231 See supra Part II.A (discussing the history and purpose of the Copyright Act). 
232 See supra note 7 (discussing Posner’s explanation of laches in Teamsters & Employers 
Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
233 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (discussing the policy objectives of 
Copyright Law and the incentive system built into the Constitution to continually 
encourage the production of creative works). 
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Further, a distinction regarding continuing infringements supports 
the policy objectives of the Copyright Act. 234  The distinction further 
clarifies when an entire claim could be barred within the limitations 
period, and the clarification guards against any chilling effect the 
amendment may have on the production or use of creative works.235  If 
authors believe that the courts powers are too broad and that courts have 
too much discretion when deciding to bar an entire claim within the 
three-year period, a distrust of copyright protection may arise.236  An 
unintended consequence might be a resurgence of the kind of mistrust of 
equitable remedies that the 1938 merger of law and equity in America 
was intended to quell.237 
Below, Part IV presents an amendment to the Copyright Act that 
combines the Ninth and Sixth Circuits’ approaches and provides a 
resolution to the circuit split that gives deference to the separation of 
powers doctrine, preserves courts’ traditional equitable powers, and 
furthers the goals of the copyright clause.238 
IV.  PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
Although trying to create a rigid rule for the application of the 
equitable defense of laches is like trying to tailor a tuxedo that would fit 
every man in America, a rule regarding the defense is needed in the 
                                                 
234 See supra Part II.A (discussing the policy objectives of the Copyright Act). 
235 See supra Part II.A.  See also supra note 16 (discussing due process concerns that arise 
when a plaintiff cannot rely on the statute of limitations to inform her of the time limits that 
apply to her cause of action).  A reasonable inference from the notion that time limits on 
suing to protect one’s copyright are flexible and to some extent unknowable is that the 
uncertainty will stifle the creation of artistic works.  The strong protection the United States 
affords to copyrightable works is designed to assure creators they will reap the rewards of 
their labor.  See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing the incentives in 
copyright law). 
236 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the distrust of equity courts in 
America pre-merger). 
237 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 115–16, n.1.  In a discussion of the role of equitable 
discretion in equity and in modern courts, Dobbs notes that Americans do not think of 
themselves as a people governed by “unknown and unknowable” laws.  Id.  Dobbs notes 
that equitable discretion cannot be applied even–handedly to all suitors.  Id. 
The first principle of due process embraces a rule of law which 
contains standards that can be known in advance, conformed to, and 
applied rationally.  The doctrine of the supremacy of law is “a doctrine 
that the sovereign and all its agencies are bound to act upon principles, 
not according to arbitrary will; are obliged to follow reason instead of 
being free to follow caprice.” 
Id. (citing Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting ROSCOE 
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 183 (1963) (1921))). 
238 See infra text accompanying note 241 for the author’s proposed amendment. 
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Copyright Act to assure stability and uniformity in copyright decisions.  
An amendment to the Copyright Act is needed to resolve the circuit split 
effectively.  Codifying the approach of the Fourth, Sixth, or Ninth 
Circuits alone is an inadequate resolution.239  This Note presents an 
amendment to the Copyright Act that borrows the Ninth Circuit’s 
distinction regarding substantially similar infringements and the Sixth 
Circuit’s presumption of timeliness.240 
A. Congress Should Amend 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) as Follows: 
 § 507. Limitations on actions 
(b)  Civil Actions.  No civil action shall be maintained 
under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced 
within three years after the claim accrued.  Traditional 
equitable defenses are available within this period, but a 
presumption of reasonable delay will be afforded to claims filed 
within three years of the infringement.  However, in cases of 
substantially similar, repetitive infringements, no such 
presumption of reasonable delay will be afforded to claims filed 
more than three years from plaintiff’s first discovery of 
infringement.241 
This amendment effectively resolves the circuit split by offering a 
more concrete guideline for courts, promoting the policy objectives of 
copyright law, and resolving separation of powers concerns.242  First, a 
presumption of timeliness provides a workable standard that promotes 
uniformity and furthers the policy objectives of the Act.243  The statute of 
limitations in the Act gives a plaintiff notice that she has three years to 
file her copyright claim.244  Although her claim may be entirely barred by 
laches within the limitations period if it represents a compelling case that 
will work an unjust hardship on the defendant, the presumption of 
timeliness safeguards the time she has to file.245  Without a presumption 
                                                 
239 See supra Part III (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of codifying the different 
circuits’ approaches to the availability of laches in copyright claims). 
240 See infra text accompanying note 241 for the author’s proposed amendment. 
241 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006).  The italicized language represents the proposed 
amendments from the author. 
242 See supra Part II.A (discussing the policy objectives of the Copyright Act). 
243 See supra Part II.A. 
244 See supra note 16 (discussing due process concerns that arise when a plaintiff cannot 
rely on the statute of limitations to inform her of the time limits that apply to her cause of 
action). 
245 See Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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in the statute that the delay is reasonable, laches could function to bar 
both legal and equitable relief without any procedural safeguard for the 
limitations period.246  By placing the burden of proof on the defendant, 
shortening a plaintiff’s time to file a claim becomes more difficult.247  The 
uncertainty that may result from explicitly recognizing the courts’ ability 
to use equitable powers within the statute of limitations is balanced by 
the procedural safeguard that will provide assurance to copyright 
holders.248 
Second, allowing laches within the statute of limitations period 
enables courts to render fair results which can only encourage the 
production of creative works.249  Restricting courts’ equitable powers by 
banning laches within the statutory period may force unjust results that 
are contrary to the intentions Congress expressed in the Copyright 
Act.250  However, acknowledging the availability of laches within the 
statutory period with no procedural safeguard or other limitation will 
not provide uniformity and may chill the production and use of creative 
works.251  If authors understand that cases will not be subject to strict 
rules which might mandate unjust consequences, incentives to put 
creative work into the marketplace will remain.252  Similarly, the 
incentive to produce creative works remains viable if authors 
understand that judges do not have unlimited discretion to shorten 
statutory periods.253 
Limiting the presumption of reasonable delay in cases of continuing 
infringements guards against the type of risk-free speculation that Judge 
Learned Hand warned against.254  Continuing infringements, such as 
those that occurred in Danjaq, are most likely to allow plaintiffs to 
impermissibly delay and only file suit when the infringer’s efforts have 
become profitable.255  In jurisdictions that use an injury rule for the 
tolling of the statute of limitations, repetitive infringement of a copyright 
                                                 
246 See id. at 229.  The Sixth Circuit offers the presumption as a procedural safeguard as a 
restraint on its equitable powers.  Id. 
247 Id. 
248 See supra Part IV (outlining proposed amendment). 
249 See supra Part II.A. 
250 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of a complete ban on 
laches). 
251 See supra note 235 (discussing the potential chilling effect of uncertain time 
limitations). 
252 See supra note 235. 
253 See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of laches and the discretion used in courts of 
equity). 
254 See supra note 99. 
255 Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 960 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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could extend the time to file indefinitely.256  For example, in Lyons, 
Plaintiff sued the costume shop for renting costumes that allegedly 
infringed on his copyright of Barney the purple dinosaur.257  Despite the 
fact that Plaintiff filed his claim four years after he knew of the first 
costume rental, the court ruled that the statute of limitations period had 
not run on any rentals that occurred within the last three years.258  
Following the reasoning in Lyons, plaintiff could passively watch as the 
costume shop rented allegedly-infringing costumes for twenty years and 
choose to sue in the twenty-first year when the costumes became 
extremely popular and profitable.259  A plaintiff who waits to sue for 
more than three years in the case of a continuing infringement should 
not get the benefit of a presumption of reasonable delay.260 
Amending the copyright act to reflect the availability of laches with a 
limited presumption of timeliness resolves separation of powers 
concerns for two reasons.  First, Congress amends the Act, thereby 
clarifying its intentions with regard to the amount of time plaintiffs have 
to file a copyright claim.261  Congress can also make its intentions clear as 
to how equitable defenses or remedies should operate in these claims.262  
As a result, courts would have more guidance as to how long a plaintiff 
has to file and in what circumstances, and would direct courts to 
promulgate congressional intent.263  Second, the proposed amendment 
offers an approach that achieves a balance between the power of 
Congress and the power of the courts.  The amendment explicitly 
recognizes courts’ equitable powers to determine reasonable and 
unreasonable delays, yet places a limit on the ability to do so.264  The 
amendment provides for a strict three-year statute of limitations to 
prevent forum shopping and create uniform guidelines, yet recognizes 
                                                 
256 See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (discussing the injury rule and 
continuing wrongs). 
257 Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001). 
258 Id. 
259 See id. 
260 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 62–68 (discussing how the varying methods courts use to calculate 
when a claim accrues has frustrated Congress’s intent to create uniformity in the Act 
through a statute of limitations). 
262 See supra text accompanying note 241 for author’s proposed amendments to the 
Copyright Act. 
263 See supra text accompanying note 241 for author’s proposed amendments to the 
Copyright Act. 
264 See supra text accompanying note 241 for author’s proposed amendments to the 
Copyright Act. 
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that rigid rules may need to be changed to fit extraordinary 
circumstances.265 
Finally, an amendment is necessary because either the cases in the 
split have not been appealed to the Supreme Court, or the Court has 
refused certiorari.266  As for areas of the law outside the copyright 
context, the Supreme Court needs to revisit the issue of laches in suits 
with explicit statutes of limitations and provide guidance in this 
“murky” area of the law.267  Courts are clearly confused and conflicted 
regarding their equitable powers in the face of congressionally-
mandated statutes of limitations.268  The Supreme Court needs to 
establish whether laches may apply to both legal and equitable causes of 
action and remedies or if the old distinction remains.269  The Court needs 
to address how continuing wrong, rolling statutes of limitations, 
discovery rules, and injury rules affect the application of laches.270  A 
Congressional amendment to the Copyright Act regarding the statute of 
limitations would aid those in copyright litigation but leave the issue 
unresolved for the vast array of other plaintiffs suing under federal 
statutes that contain time limitations. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is a divide both inside and outside the context of the 
Copyright Act about whether laches may operate to cut short an explicit 
federal statute of limitations without violating separation of powers 
principles.  This confusion in the courts goes to fundamental questions 
about the nature of statutes of limitations and the traditional equitable 
powers of the courts.  In the copyright context, the results vary from 
circuit to circuit, and outside the copyright context, the answer is no 
                                                 
265 See supra note 36 (listing cases that recognize the use of laches in cases with 
extraordinary circumstances).  
266 Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (not appealed 
to the Supreme Court); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007), cert 
denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001) (not 
appealed to the Supreme Court); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 
2002), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1066 (2002); Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of 
Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008) (not appealed to the Supreme Court).  
267 Laycock acknowledges that this area of the law remains “murky.”  LAYCOCK, supra 
note 16, at 7–8.  “Where the law/equity distinction is especially murky, . . . lawyers and 
judges tend to overlook it, and the distinction becomes less and less important.”  Id. 
268 See supra Part.II.C.2 (discussing the approach taken by cases in the copyright circuit 
split). 
269 See supra note 267 (discussing the distinction between law and equity). 
270 See supra notes 62–68 (discussing how the varying methods courts use to calculate 
when a claim accrues has frustrated Congress’s intent to create uniformity in the Act 
through a statute of limitations). 
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clearer with some courts denying themselves the power to cut short 
explicit federal statutes of limitations and others freely doing so. 
The copyright circuit split demonstrates that the judiciary is 
uncertain about the role of laches in cases with express statutes of 
limitations.  Judge Posner dismisses the argument that laches could 
violate separation of powers principles as “odd.”271  Yet, other sources 
proclaim that “laches is irrelevant” in a suit with a statute of 
limitations.272  Textbooks give a fleeting reference to a line of cases which 
stand for the proposition that laches can never operate to shorten a 
statute of limitations.273  The Supreme Court states that the application of 
laches to an action at law would be “novel.”274  Further, the Court has 
cautioned against the application of equitable principles to 
Congressional mandates.275 
The debate regarding laches and separation of powers principles is 
problematic.  The Supreme Court needs to address the issue to provide 
clarity for all areas of the law, and an amendment to the Copyright Act is 
needed to resolve cases in the copyright context.  Codifying the approach 
of the Fourth, Sixth, or Ninth Circuits alone would provide an 
inadequate resolution.  Amending the Copyright Act to reflect the 
availability of laches within the statute of limitations, but provide a 
limiting presumption of timeliness in cases that do not involve 
continuing infringements offers the best solution.  The proposed 
amendment effectively resolves the circuit split by offering concrete 
guidance for courts, promoting the policy objectives of copyright law, 
and resolving separation of powers concerns. 
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272 See LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003. 
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274 County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (noting in 
dicta that the application of laches in an action at law would be “novel”). 
275 See supra note 8 (discussing the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131–32 (1995) that the separation of powers is a restraint on a court’s 
equity powers). 
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